How China Copied Its Way to Building a World-Class Air-to-Air Missile

On September 24, 1958, disaster loomed for China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) as its jets plummeted into Wenzhou Bay.

For several days, its J-5 “Fresco” jets (license-built Soviet MiG-17s) had jousted with Taiwan’s U.S.-supplied F-86F “Sabre” jets, leveraging their higher service ceiling to safely cruise above the Sabres unbothered until ready to pounce.

But things didn’t go according to the PLAAF’s plan that day, because a few months earlier in June, the U.S. Navy secretly upgraded 20 of Taiwan’s Sabres to launch the GAR-9 Sidewinder (soon re-designated the AIM-9B), then a state-of-the-art missile.

Ben Martin//Getty Images

Republic of China Air Force F-86F jet fighters in southern Taiwan in September 1958 during the Second Taiwan Strait crisis.

The heat-seeking sorcery of Sidewinders fired by Sabres from below caught PLAAF pilots unprepared—after all, guided air-to-air missiles had never before been used in combat. The J-5s hastily merged downwards into a dogfight with the Sabres, which went badly, with 10 PLAAF jets lost, three or four of them downed by Sidewinders.

By the time the so-called Second Taiwan Strait Crisis came to its conclusion that December, Taiwan’s Sabre pilots claimed they downed 31 MiGs for the loss of two F-86s. (PLAAF history insists its fighters scored 14 kills for five losses.)

Though Taiwan’s Sabres still scored plenty of gun kills, they provided early evidence that air-to-air missiles (AAMs), not machine guns, cannons, or even unguided rockets, would eventually dominate air-to-air warfare, and that China and its Soviet allies had fallen behind. While a year earlier the Soviets first had the K-5, a short-range radar-guided missile which China acquired for license production after the crisis under the designation Thunderbolt-1 (or PL-1), its short range and inflexible radar-guidance system led PL-1 production to end early in 1970.

k5m missile mounted on mig19 jet at army history museum in kecel, hungary

Varga Atilla (CC BY-SA3)//Wikimedia Commons

The radar-guided Soviet K-5M air-to-air missile monunted on a MiG-19 fighter, though a pioneer, was at best somewhat useable against bombers but little applicability against agile fighters due to need to keep the firing jets nose-mounted radar precisely slewed on target. China license-produced their own PL-1 missile, four of which could fit on a J-6 fighter (China’s version of the MiG-19.)

However, the skirmishes with Taiwan wound up having a big silver-lining for China and the Soviet Union when, on September 28, a damaged MiG-17 managed to limp back to base with an unexploded Sidewinder missile embedded in its fuselage.

Though unsuccessful in reverse-engineering the Sidewinder, China negotiated its release to the Soviet Union, which successfully cloned the weapon into the K-13 missile (NATO codename AA-2 Atoll). Starting in the mid-1960s, North Vietnamese MiG-21 fighters began using K-13s to shoot down dozens of U.S. warplanes.

Despite China-U.S.S.R. relations collapsing in June 1960, in 1961 the Soviets honored their promise and gave China K-13 missiles and schematics. It took roughly a decade more for mass production of China’s copy of the Soviet copy of the Sidewinder to begin under the designation PL-2.

chinese pl2 missile on display based on aim 9 sidewinder

Ryo Chiijiwa (CC BY2)//Wikimedia Commons

PL-2 missiles, a copy of a Soviet copy of the AIM-9 Sidewinder missile, on display at the Military Museum of the Chinese People’s Revolution ni June 2010.

For four more decades, Chinese engineers repeatedly acquired additional foreign missiles and figured out how to produce and improve upon them. Finally, by the 2000s and 2010s, China’s designers hit a turning point fielding designs equaling or in some cases exceeding performance of rival Western and Russian armaments.

Sidewinders and Sparrows with Chinese characteristics

MARK RALSTON//Getty Images

An exhibition of PLA Air Force weaponry in at the PLA Army Aviation Museum. The white air-to-air missiles in front row (starting from left) include the PL-5 descended from the K-13/AIM-9 Sidewinder; the PL-9 (hybrid of Magic, Python and Sidewinder); the PL-8 based on Israeli Python missile; the PL-11 based on Italian Aspide/AIM-7; the PL-12 (indigenous, but using R-77 seeker), culminating in trio of Russian/Ukrainian weapons for Sukhoi jets and domestic clones: short-range R-73, medium-range R-27R, and medium/long-range R-77 (ie. RVV-AE.)

Based on the 5” diameter hull of the Zuni unguided rocket, the AIM-9B was more practical than the K-5/PL-1, but it still had stringent limitations. It had to be aimed extremely precisely to lock on—no more than four degrees of deviation from the target—and strictly from behind at that aircraft’s hot engine exhaust, so using them against enemies approaching head-on was a no-go. It also needed to be aimed away from the sun, which tended to lure missiles astray.

The PL-2 was only authorized for mass production in 1972, with 2,950 delivered by the time production was closed in 1983. Poor performance in tests during the 1970s (including premature detonation of the proximity fuse and sun-locking) caused rounds to be returned to factories for refurbishing.

Chinese engineers made several attempts to improve the PL-2, starting with the PL-3 which began testing in 1968. However, disruption caused by the Cultural Revolution so delayed R&D efforts that it was cancelled in 1980. In 1977, China also obtained two newer AIM-9E Sidewinders which it used to create the improved PL-2B with a new seeker, greater range (from 4.7 miles to 6 miles) and a new cooling system.

The 612^th Institute (now called Luoyang Electro-Optics Technology Development) sought to make a radar-guided Sidewinder called PL-5A, comparable to the AIM-9C and K-13R missiles, but it too was canceled in 1983.

However, a PL-5B model reverting to infra-red guidance finally entered production in 1986 with its range boosted to 10 miles. China managed to export the lightweight PL-5s and improved PL-5EIIs (boasting low-smoke engines, laser proximity fuses, and dual-band IR seekers) to 10 countries in Asia, Africa, and South America. PL-5s remain in common use on older Chinese jets unable to carry larger missiles.

chinese pl 5 missile based on sidewinder missile

Wikimedia Commons

Short-range PL-5 air-to-air missile on display alongside a K-8W jet trainer. The PL-5B and PL-5E are the ultimate Chinese evolution of the AIM-9B Sidewinder missile first recovered from a damaged J-7 jet in 1958, and remains in common use today.

In 1966, 612 Institute also began developing a longer-range radar-guided PL-4 missile influenced by an American AIM-7D Sparrow recovered by North Vietnam and passed on to China. Intended to arm a planned J-9 supersonic interceptor, the Cultural Revolution’s turmoil caused progress on both to slow to a crawl, leading to their cancellation for premature obsolescence between 1980 and 1984.

Though PLAAF’s supersonic J-6 fighters (based on Soviet MiG-19) could carry up to four PL-2s and shot down at least six U.S. military jets between 1965 and 1967, mostly over the South China Sea, it’s likely that Chinese air-to-air missiles hadn’t yet reached operational use by then—which implies the PLAAF may hadn’t yet used any air-to-air missiles in combat.

retired shenyang j 6 fighter aircraft in jilin

VCG//Getty Images

A J-6 on display with four PL-2 missiles underwing at a defense park in Jilin in 2021. Since the type’s retirement in 2006, some of the 4,500 J-6s built remain very popular ’monument’ aircraft in China.

However, exported J-6s (called F-6s) armed with PL-2s apparently did see action. The Pakistani Air Force claims it shot down at least one Indian Su-7 ground attack jet using a PL-2 in the 1971 India-Pakistan war. An Indian account insists all Su-7 losses were due to ground fire, but does describe at least two Su-7s (those of Wing Commander H.S. Mangat and Flt. Lt. J.S. Ghuman) surviving hits by Sidewinders fired by J-6s. Given the PL-2’s similarity to Sidewinder (also used by Pakistan’s J-6s), positive identification is difficult.

Nixon—then Magic, Python, and Aspide—go to China

Due both to China and the U.S. rapprochement in the 1970s and hostile relations with the Soviet Union, China progressively gained access to U.S., West European and Israeli defense markets—offering shortcuts to make back time lost during the Cultural Revolution.

Somehow the Zhuzhou Aeroengine Factory acquired and reverse-engineered France’s R.550 Magic short-range missile, which was mostly comparable to the Sidewinder but more maneuverable due to its distinctive second canard fin near the nose. China canceled production of conceptually similar PL-6 missile (combining PL-5A and PL-3 elements) and began mass producing cloned Magics, or PL-7s, which were rumored to be inferior in quality.

In the 1980s, China exported 400 PL-7s to Iran alongside 2,500 PL-2s and PL-2As and several F-7/J-7 fighters. These were also adapted for mounting on Iran’s American-built F-4E Phantom and F-5 Freedom Fighter jets, as well as French-built Mirage F1s captured from Iraq in 1991.

M Shahriar [email protected]//Wikimedia Commons
Bangladesh Air Force F-7BG jet (export model of the Chengdu J-7, a reverse-engineered Soviet MiG-21 fighter) armed with a blue PL-7 missile.

Meanwhile, in 1983, China’s Xi’an Eastern Machinery Factory acquired license-production rights for Israel’s Python-III heat-seeking missile, which had attracted Chinese interest a year earlier when Israeli F-16s downed 35 to 50 Syrian fighters without a loss.

Even imported Python-IIIs were re-designated PL-8s, perhaps to obfuscate their Israeli origin from Muslim client states. The PL-8 was in operational use on Chinese fighters by 1986, while Chinese factories became capable of fully indigenous production several years later under the designation PL-8A.

The Python/PL-8 is capable of all-aspect engagement like later Sidewinders and has a higher maximum speed of Mach 3.5 or 4. China has deployed a Helmet Mounted Sight allowing targeting of PL-8s far away from the aircraft’s nose as well as a PL-8B model with expanded firing angles. They are still commonly seen on modern PLA fighters.

For a good measure, in 1986, Luoyang developed a novel PL-9 missile combining PL-5 and PL-7 airframe elements with the seeker from a PL-8—in other words, a hybrid of the Sidewinder, Magic and Python-III. This “super PL-8” saw only modest production.

China’s air force still needed a medium-range, radar-guided missile for the J-8-II “Finback” interceptor (which took up the J-9’s mantle) after the failure of prior radar-guided missile programs.

AFP//Getty Images
Chinese J-15 ’Flying Shark’ fighters on carrier Liaoning with wings folded. On the wingtip rails are PL-8 missiles based on Israeli Python-3 with its distinctive large, swept tail fins; mid-wing are PL-12 missiles comparable in performance to U.S. AIM-120C missile.

China finally filled this gap when it arranged for licensed production of Italy’s Aspide missile—itself descended from the AIM-7E Sparrow missile (though its internal components differed substantially.)

Though the Aspide license was withdrawn following the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, the Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology began producing Aspide clones called the PL-11 a few years later to arm J-8 fighters. The ultimate PL-11B model finally incorporated a miniaturized AMR-1 active seeker in the nose allowing a degree of fire-and-forget employment.

Another important development helping “unlock” beyond-visual-range air-to-air warfare for China was acquisition of Italian Grifo, Israeli ELM-2034 and American AN/APG-66(V) radars, the last via the Peace Pearl program intended to upgrade Chinese jets (particularly the J-8-II fighter) with F-16 technology. Peace Pearl was ultimately terminated not by U.S. misgivings over Tiananmen, but by China in 1990 when the PLAAF grew impatient with the U.S. defense industry cost overruns.

In the 1980s, Chinese air-to-air missiles were increasingly exported to African countries, and client states including Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan, Iran, and Venezuela, often bundled alongside low-cost export fighters, notably the older J-6, Q-5, and J-7, as well as the newer JF-17.

Export missiles usually have reduced range and different designations (example: the PL-12’s export model is the SD-10) or have an E appended to the model number (export PL-15 is PL-15E). However, export models of certain older missiles were actually upgraded to improve sales appeal, as well as use by the PLAAF.

The Russians are coming (back): Soviet air-to-air weapons return to China

Even as the floodgates of Western military-technology dried up post-Tiananmen, the collapse of the Soviet Union washed away the bitterness of Moscow and Beijing’s intra-Communist disputes. Cash-strapped Russia and Ukraine were eager to sell off Soviet weapons at bargain-bin prices to alleviate unstable economies undergoing “shock therapy” conversion to capitalism.

For example, Ukraine sold to China 1,309 radar-guided R-27R medium-range missiles, and 124 extended-range R-27ER missiles between 1994 and 2010 as well as a license to build them in China. The short comings of the R-27R’s semi-active radar guidance system however led to poor performance in air wars over Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Ukraine.

As China bought Su-27, Su-30MK2 and Su-35S “Flanker” fighters from Russia, they were bundled with excellent R-73 short-range missiles and at least 400 RVV-AE medium- and long-range missiles—an export model of Russia’s R-77 missile crucially retaining a built-in active seeker, freeing the launching aircraft from having to continuously point its own radar at the target until the missile hits. Some improved R-77-1s may also have been transferred with China’s purchase of Russian Su-35S fighters in 2015.

Feature China//Getty Images
PLAAF two-seat J-11BS fighter training over Zhejiang with a highly agile R-73 short-range missile visible on its left wingtip rail–appropriate as the R-73 was meant for the Soviet Su-27 fighter the J-11 is based upon.

Though Chinese companies reverse-engineered Russian Su-27, Su-30 and Su-33 jet fighters for domestic production, they didn’t clone Russian missiles outright. However, the R-77’s 9B-1348 active radar seeker was incorporated into the PL-12 beyond-visual range missile, which finally helped China achieve rough parity with Russian and U.S. long-range weapons. This missile, identifiable by its pentagonal rear tail fin, has a range of 43 to 62 miles depending on the model and can be guided discreetly via datalink without triggering the target’s radar warning receiver before switching to its “noisy” active seeker when completing the kill.

China also finally fielded a top-class short-range air-to-air missile called the PL-10 (initially, PL-ASR) in the same ballpark as the U.S. AIM-9X and Russian R-74 missile. Its key characteristics include:

90-degree high-off boresight (HOBS) capability targeting using a Western-style Helmet Mounted Sight (i.e. the pilot can turn his head to target aircraft rather than having to slew the entire plane to point at the target)

lock-on-after-launch capability via datalink

high maneuverability enabled by thrust-vectoring engines

high G-force tolerance (60 Gs)

all-aspect engagement capability (no more having to get behind the enemy)

decoy-resistant infrared imaging seeker using a focal plane array

M.ASIF AMIN (CC01)//Wikimedia Commons
South African/Brazilian Denel A-Darter short-range air-to-air missile designed to work with helmet mounted sight, with maximized maneuverability and tolerance to the point it can engage enemies behind the launching aircraft (an ’over-the-shoulder’ shot). Ordered for use on South Africa’s JAS 39 Gripen fighters, there have been lengthy delays delivering combat-capable missiles.

Emperornie (CCA-SA2)//Wikimedia Commons
Detail showing a PL-10 missile ready for release from one of two cheek bays on the J-20.

The PL-10, however, which in its initial prototype from (AKA the PL-ASR) appears highly similar to the South African Denel Darter air-to-air missile (save for rear fin shape), and likely springs resulting from a seeming technology transfer with Denel in the early 2000s.

Admittedly, the PL-10’s alleged maximum range of 12 miles, however, falls below the 18 to 25 miles attributed to the AIM-9X and R-74.

The Great Leap Forward of Chinese air-to-air missiles

Several factors converged at the turn of the century to enable China to leap ahead of the U.S. in air-to-air missile technology.

First of all, the Pentagon cut investments in air-to-air technology as it became consumed with counter-insurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

And on China’s end, the devastation of Iraq’s large ground army in 1991 by Western airpower compelled the PLA attempt to pursue U.S.-style “network-centric” warfare strategies wherein dispersed platforms could pool together sensor data and pass it on to units launching guided weapons for maximum firepower efficiency.

China’s military industry increasingly offered the technical means thanks to the long coat tails of the Middle Kingdom’s rising commercial consumer electronics and communication sector. That enabled China to race ahead of Russia in operationally fielding AESA-class radars, combat drones, and digital networks. These combined with new airborne early warning planes and long-range missiles furnished the necessary links to form a “kill chain” connecting dispersed sensors, shooters, and munitions.

In 2015, China first unveiled the PL-15, designed so four of the nearly 4-meter-long missiles could fit inside a J-20 stealth fighter’s weapons bay. Its dual-pulse engine is believed to achieve somewhere between 124 and 186 miles range, exceeding that of the U.S. AIM-120D missile.

Emperornie (CCA-SA2)//Wikimedia Commons
J-20 fighter at the 2018 Zhuhai airshow shows of its weapons fully loaded with powerful PL-15 missiles. A PL-10 missile can also be seen in ready-to-fire position from one of the jet’s two ’cheek’ bays for short-range missiles. Stowing weapons internally is essential for stealth fighters to remain as low-observable to enemy radars as possible.

Besides its active radar seeker, the PL-15 retains a two-way datalink and inertial and satellite navigation, facilitating its “stealthy” use without exposing the launching fighter or alerting the target until too late.

It’s possible the next-gen PL-X missile China has begun fielding actually represents just one of two R&D streams. For now, the PL-17—an over-sized (6-meters-long) long-range missile believed to be in the 240 to 310 mile range class (at least equaling Russia’s notorious R-37M missile).

But there were also reports of a PL-21 ramjet-powered missile similar to the European MBDA Meteor missile. Ramjets have the advantage of being “throttleable,” able to slow down for range efficiency while retaining the ability to surge to maximum speeds during the terminal phase to improve odds of a kill. However, ramjet propulsion is more expensive and complicated than adding an additional solid fuel rocket.

Chinese social media//Wikimedia Commons
Chinese J-16 Flanker fighter first seen taking off with the lengthy PL-17 missile in 2016.

There are also unconfirmed claims that China is working on a compact PL-16 missile, supposedly combining the PL-15-class long-range performance with a smaller form factor than the short-range PL-10 missile. The goal is for a J-20 stealth fighter to carry six PL-16s up from the current four PL-10s or PL-15s.

A final curiosity is the tiny PL-90 (or TY-90) air-to-air missile weighing just 44 pounds, designed for use on attack and medium helicopters (China’s Z-9, Z-10 and Z-19, and Russia’s Mi-17) and on medium-sized UCAV combat drones.

TEH ENG KOON//Getty Images
TY-90 (AKA PL-90) infrared-guided air-to-air missile on display in at a Beijing expo in 2007. While helicopter air-to-air combat appears to remain a niche capability, its potential combination with UCAV-class combat drones may have interesting applications.

Reminiscent of the U.S.’s helicopter/drone-launched AIM-92 Stinger missile, the PL-90s have range of 3.7 to 5 miles and speed of Mach 2. Three different variants exist with progressively more advanced seekers (dual band-IR, infrared plus ultraviolet, and finally infrared imaging)

Why do China’s air-to-air missiles matter?

The air war over the skies of Ukraine since 2022 has been heavily characterized by the dominant influence of ground-based air defenses sharply limiting use of both sides’s manned aircraft. Meanwhile, air-to-air missile shots (mostly fired by Russian jets from beyond visual-range) account for a relatively smaller share of attrition.

However, air-to-air combat capability would play an important role in any conflict with Taiwan, particularly to prevent U.S. warplanes and cruise missiles from coming to Taiwan’s aid. Interdicting those approaches would require Chinese fighters to patrol north, south, and especially east of Taiwan, likely beyond the reach of friendly ground—and possibly even sea-based air defenses.

PLAAF fighters and their air-to-air weaponry might also have a large role in escorting China’s JH-7 and slower H-6 bombers attempting to harry U.S. carrier task forces east of Taiwan, while also trying to hunt U.S. bombers and support aircraft (tankers, AWACS, maritime patrol planes etc.) lurking behind screens of protecting fighters.

After a half-century of aggressively acquiring and reinventing foreign technology, China developed a genuine indigenous missile design capacity and closed a major technical gap with the U.S. and Russian militaries.

That said, technological innovation must be paired with evolution of training, tactics, and procedures, particularly for fighting as a joint force fully leveraging such technical capabilities—transformations which are difficult to qualitatively evaluate. The air war over Ukraine, after all, has dramatically illustrated how air forces can perform much worse, or better, than one might infer from technology alone.

Sébastien Roblin has written on the technical, historical, and political aspects of international security and conflict for publications including 19FortyFive, The National Interest, MSNBC, Forbes.com, Inside Unmanned Systems and War is Boring. He holds a Master’s degree from Georgetown University and served with the Peace Corps in China. You can follow his articles on Twitter.