What is consent? | Mises Institute

James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock’s The calculation of consent– published over sixty years ago in 1962 – has been one of the most influential books applying economic ideas to politics. The authors were by no means libertarians, but for the most part they supported a limited state and the free market. An additional point in their favor was that both authors read my book reviews. In this week’s column I’m going to discuss some interesting points in the book, some of which haven’t received as much attention as they deserve.

The authors are strong advocates of methodological individualism and quote that of Ludwig von Mises Human action in defense of this view. Actions must always be traceable to individual decisions, and they reject ‘organic’ views of the state that see the state as independent of individuals.

So much is known, but one issue that has not received sufficient attention is their use of methodological individualism to critique Marx’s theory of history. Marx views classes as groups acting as whole entities and does not show how individuals are motivated to act in accordance with their assumed class interests. They blame historian Charles A. Beard for his use of Marx’s theory in interpreting American history. A more realistic view, they suggest, would see individuals belonging to different Marxist classes as allies to gain government favors. They formulated the problem as follows:

The largely overlooked point is that it remains entirely appropriate to assume that people are motivated by utility considerations, while at the same time rejecting the economic determinism implicit in the entire Marxist stream of thought. Differences in utility functions arise from differences in taste as much as anything else. The class status of the individual in the production process is one of the minor determinants of real economic importance. The phenomenon of textile unions and textile companies working together to exert political pressure for the ban of Japanese imports is far better known on the contemporary American scene than any general political activity involving labor, capital, or land interests.

Let’s look at another topic that has stirred up a lot of controversy. Does support for the free market imply support for open borders? Buchanan and Tulloch don’t think so. They say this will lead to conflict between people and make agreement on joint projects more difficult. For the same reason it is better to have a small state than a large one. They say about this:

It seems reasonable to expect that there will be more investment in negotiations in a group composed of members who have clearly different physical characteristics than in a group composed of more or less homogeneous members. The increased uncertainty about the tastes and negotiating skills of his fellow human beings will cause the individual to become more stubborn in his own efforts. Knowing his fellow human beings better, the individual will be less stubborn in his negotiations, and for perfectly rational reasons. The total costs of decision making, given any collective choice rule, will be lower in communities characterized by a reasonably homogeneous population than in communities characterized by a heterogeneous population.

So far I have emphasized topics in which the authors reach conclusions that Rothbardians will like. But there are also topics that definitely go in the other direction. Buchanan and Tulloch are moral skeptics (that is, they do not believe that the moral rules are objectively true). Individuals who are attracted to views such as natural law and who accept objective morality can use these views in constructing a personal morality, but for that they do not belong in politics. Rothbardians, on the other hand, believe that the ethics that define a good legal system are the part of objective morality that focuses on the permissible use of force.

Buchanan and Tulloch say in this regard that “it should not be surprising that the most ‘sympathetic’ or ‘sympathetic’ works are to be found among the ‘realists’ in the history of political doctrine. Initially we look at Glaucon in Plato’s Republicto Thomas Hobbes and to Benedict Spinoza.”

While they recognize that individuals can be influenced by moral ideals, they generally think that people – in economics as well as in politics – strive to make as much money as possible. People guided by morality – who they often call ‘Kantians’ – will tend to take advantage of their less scrupulous fellow members of society and, reluctant to be ‘suckers’, will compromise their ideals. Everything has its price, including morality.

This view leads to what is both a strength and a weakness of their conception of politics. People in government do not seek power over others for its own sake, but rather view political office as a way to gain money. This is a strength because it leads them to a skeptical view of politicians: they are not “civil servants”, eager to pursue the “common good”, but no better than anyone else. But it is also a weakness because they think that politicians are no worse than other people. The historical record clearly shows that they are much worse.

I don’t want to end on a negative note. Although they accept the concept of ‘public goods’, rather than rejecting it root and branch in the style of Rothbard, they at least recognize that these goods do not have to be provided by the state. Often individuals can voluntarily supply the good themselves and in such cases people will often prefer private provision to state provision. Unfortunately, they don’t think this is always the rational course of action, but it’s certainly better than nothing.