A new era of reform amid Sri Lanka’s economic turmoil – The Diplomat

National People’s Power (NPP) leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake was sworn in as the ninth executive president of Sri Lanka September 23. In the presidential election held on September 21, the NPP leader obtained 5,740,179 votes (5,634,915 votes in the first count and 105,264 votes more in the second count). He obtained almost 43 percent of the valid votes.

The growing support for Dissanayake, a centre-left politician often mislabelled as a ‘Marxist’ by the international media, is a reflection of wider social unrest in Sri Lanka. His advocacy for transparency and criticism of the political status quo has struck a chord with young voters and those hardest hit by the economic crisis that has plagued the country for years. His vision for renegotiate the agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to make austerity measures more manageable for the working class, and its promise to eradicate the crisis corruptionhave positioned him as a fresh voice amidst the chaos.

Dissanayake’s election shows that a significant portion of the electorate believes that traditional politics has failed to deliver stability, growth or relief from economic hardship. Dissanayake’s NPP won only about 3 percent of the vote in the 2020 general elections.

His main opponent, Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) presidential candidate Sajith Premadasa, received 4,530,902 votes (4,363,035 votes in the first count and 167,867 in the second). He received almost 32 percent of the valid votes. This is a decrease from his count of 5.5 million (41.9 percent) votes in 2019 against Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Although Premadasa was initially a frontrunner, he lost momentum towards the end due to partisan strife, his inability to communicate effectively with the public and a significant portion of the potential votes being captured by independent candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe, the incumbent president.

Since no candidate received more than 50 percent of the valid votes to secure the presidency outright, the Election Commission (EC) counted second and third preferences for the first time in Sri Lanka. Dissanayake, who had received more than 1.3 million votes in the first count over Premadasa, had no trouble clearing this hurdle.

As expected, Dissanayake’s support came from the south, where people are particularly concerned about tackling corruption and there is widespread anger at the established political parties for decimating the country’s economy, falling living standards and a stagnant economy. Dissanayake won the constituencies of Kalutara, Galle, Matara, Puttalam, Anuradhapura, Kegalle, Gampaha, Colombo, Ratnapura, Hambantota, Monaragala, Kurunegala, Matale, Kandy and Polonnaruwa.

Premadasa won areas with large minority populations, including the north and east, as well as the Badulla and Nuwara Eliya districts. However, this is mainly due to the fact that the political parties who traditionally represented these communities had a electoral alliance with the SJB. The Nuclear power plant has decided to pursue a strategy of building up its own basic structures in these areas, which will take a few more years.

Wickremesinghe polled 2,299,767 votes (17.27 percent) and Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) candidate Namal Rajapaksa polled 342,781 votes (2.57 percent). P. Ariyanethiran, who identified himself as the “regular Tamil candidate”, polled 226,342 votes (1.70 percent), while all other candidates polled 556,772 votes (4.18 percent).

The elections also saw a dramatic collapse in support for the long-in-the-making nationalist SLPP. The Rajapaksa political dynasty was in the center of Sri Lanka’s economic collapse, with rampant borrowing and mismanagement pushing the country into defaulting on its debt obligations debt in 2022The subsequent shortages of basic necessities – fuel, medicine and food – coupled with the unrest that followed, led to the death of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. exile and resignationmarking a turning point in public sentiment. People’s anger at the political elite has only grown as the recovery stalls, with many still struggling with high taxes, inflation and austerity measures tied to the IMF bailout.

Wickremesinghe, the most right-wing of the four main candidates who stabilized the country after the crisis, has also failed to regain public trust. While his government has made some progress in debt restructuring and economic recovery, the high cost of living and perceived accommodation of the IMF’s stringent demands have left many feeling betrayed. His image as a technocrat unable to connect with ordinary Sri Lankans has further widened the gap between him and the electorate, creating space for a figure like Dissanayake to rise.

Wickremesinghe is also seen as a protector of the Rajapaksas and their allies, and the fact that almost 100 SLPP MPs joined him helped his cause. He received just over 2.2 million votes. In the 2020 general election, his United National Party (UNP) received less than 250,000 votes, so his vote share this time around marks an equally dramatic increase as that of the NPP.

The way forward

Dissanayake is expected dissolve Parliament coming soon, with general elections expected within two months. Currently, the NPP has only three parliamentary seats, excluding Dissanayake himself. Until the electionsDissanayake is expected to rule the country in November with a streamlined cabinet of three ministers and 15 ministerial secretaries.

One of Dissanayake’s immediate challenges will be to convince the Sri Lankan business community, foreign investors and international capital markets that the NPP is not the radical force that some media outlets have portrayed it to be. Supporters of former leaders Wickremesinghe and Premadasa have spent months depict the nuclear power plant as inexperienced adventurers who would destabilize the country – a story that has gained popularity, especially within some parts of the business world. This uncertainty is further increased by speculation that the IMF deal with Sri Lanka under NPP leadership could fail.

Dissanayake is however clearly that his government will not withdraw from the IMF program. He has stressed that if renegotiating the Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) proves to be time-consuming or too costly, the NPP will abide by the existing agreement. Furthermore, the NPP has shown its willingness to to collaborate with the IMF and other international organizations to combat corruption. One of Dissanayake’s top priorities should be to urgently engage with the IMF, other multilateral organizations and the business community to dispel any doubts about the country’s economic stability under his leadership.

In addition, Dissanayake has been accused of providing financial support to the NPP from China, an allegation that has raised concerns about potential friction with the United States and India. In response, Dissanayake has consistently refused all financial ties with China and assured both Washington and New Delhi that Sri Lanka will not be used to undermine their security interests. He also stressed the importance of maintaining strong ties with India, welcoming Indian investment as part of his economic strategy. As he moves forward, Dissanayake’s ability to balance domestic reforms with geopolitical pressure will be crucial.

Over the past decade, Dissanayake has demonstrated a pragmatic and adaptive political style. When he assumed the leadership of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the main party in the NPP coalition, had a reputation for radical politics. Since the 1970s, the JVP has undergone significant transformations, from an anti-imperialist, socialist party that sought to overthrow capitalism to a Sinhalese nationalist platform in the 1980s that opposed Tamil self-rule and India’s involvement in the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. The party was banned for trumped up accusations having been involved in the anti-Tamil pogrom in 1983, but in 1994 he returned to mainstream politics.

Under Dissanayake’s leadership, the JVP has broadened its appeal, targeting middle-class and diaspora communities. While critics have accused it of abandoning its socialist roots, the NPP’s focus on grassroots mobilization gained momentum, particularly during the 2022 protests that led to the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Despite its disappointing performances in the 2019 presidential election and 2020 parliamentary elections, where it was derided as the “3 percent party,” the NPP has rebranded itself as a voice for the people, capitalizing on public frustration with the political establishment and advocating for systemic change.

Having inherited a country in deep economic distress, Dissanayake’s presidency will be defined by whether he can deliver on his promises of reform and systemic change while maintaining stability. His leadership, characterised by pragmatism and adaptability, will be tested as he faces the monumental task of steering Sri Lanka through the current crisis and restoring public confidence in governance. The coming months will tell whether Dissanayake can pull off this delicate balancing act, ensuring both economic recovery and political reform while retaining his broad base of support.